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Abstract—In network level forensics, Domain Name Service
(DNS) is a rich source of information. This paper describes a new
approach to mine DNS data for forensic purposes. We propose
a new technique that leverages semantic and natural language
processing tools in order to analyze large volumes of DNS data.
The main research novelty consists in detecting malicious and
dangerous domain names by evaluating the semantic similarity
with already known names. This process can provide valuable
information for reconstructing network and user activities. We
show the efficiency of the method on experimental real datasets
gathered from a national passive DNS system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing number of attacks occurring every
day in Internet and their increasing variety and complexity,
being protected to all of them is quite unfeasible. Reports
like [1] show such an evolution as well as recent facts
highlighting the inability, even for big companies or govern-
ments, to counter some attacks [2]. Therefore, cyber-crime
is now a main concern where the attacker motivation has
shifted from technical challenges to financial, political or
ideological reasons. In such a context, detecting and analyzing
attacks is essential for system recovery and for preventing
future intrusions. Identifying the responsible people and their
motivation is also essential to take legal actions. This leads
to have dedicated digital forensic techniques for gathering
knowledge about intrusions to figure out relevant evidences.
As digital infrastructures are ever bigger and more complex,
a primary issue is the volume of data to handle [3] which
is all the more important with standards tools, e.g. Safeback1,
which require a lot of manual support. Fully or semi automated
analysis is so an important research field as for example [3].
From a network point of view, full packet analysis is proposed
in [4]. To achieve scalability, using a compressed source of
information like network flow data was introduced in [5].
This paper focuses on network forensics and in particular
passive DNS analysis [6]. DNS analysis is powerful for net-
work forensics. It can capture evidences of attacks as popular
threats usually rely on it for being efficient. Because the main
functionality provides a translation of human readable names
into machine addresses, it is also used by botnets which are
known, as the vector of many other attacks, to be a major threat
[1]. Fast-flux [7] consists into naming a phishing website or
the C&C (Command and Control) of a botnet with a unique
1http://www.forensics-intl.com/safeback.html
DNS name which points alternatively and rapidely to distinct
IP addresses.
Moreover, the amount of information is quite limited com-
pared with traffic data as DNS traffic is only a subset. As
the passive capture does not store information about request
originators, it is privacy friendly which is also an issue in
forensics [5], [8].
In this paper, we propose a tool to automatically ana-
lyze passive DNS data for tracking malicious related do-
mains which should be considered as a good starting
point for an in-depth analysis of network and user ac-
tivity whereas considering all of them is not scalable. In
particular, our analysis relies on the semantic of DNS
names because malicious related names are mainly con-
structed from a specific semantic field to lure the user
by using attractive words including and combining brand
names or specific keywords like secure or protection [9]:
for example, protectionmicrosoftxpscanner.com,
securepaypal.com or domainsecurenethp.com.
Starting from the fact that users complain about payment
done over paypal that they never did, a first step may reveal
that credentials have been stolen (connection from unusual
locations). Then, a semantic based DNS analysis would reveal
potential harmful websites like www.securepaypal.com where
the users connected to. Hence, this phishing website can be
identified as the original source of the problem.
Therefore, new metrics are defined to catch the semantic
properties of DNS names and evaluated to measure their ability
to distinguish malicious names from legitimate ones.
The paper is structured as follows: the overall architecture,
including an overview in DNS, is described in section II.
Semantic based metrics are formally defined in section III
before being assessed in section IV. Section V presents related
work before the conclusion in section VI.
II. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
For sake of clarity, DNS is introduced in this section
but further details may be found in [10] (caching, reverse
DNS, etc). The primary objective of DNS is to translate
a human understandable address into an IP address. DNS
names are organized in a hierarchical manner. For example,
www.uni.lu is a domain name2 which has 3 levels with lu
the first level also called the top level domain (TLD), uni
2A domain name can be either a final host or a domain including several
final hosts
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Fig. 1: Architecture overview
the second level, www the third one. Of course there are other
subdomains. For example, all *.lu domains are subdomains
of lu TLD.
When a DNS client wants to access www.uni.lu, he sends
a request to a recursive DNS server, commonly provided by
his operator. The latter then resolves the query by contacting
iteratively the authoritative servers of the different levels
starting first with a root server which indicates the authoritative
server for the lu domain, which can then resolve the query
uni.lu and so on. Except for the first query performed by
the client, all others are requested by the recursive DNS server
itself before returning the final answer, the IP address of the
requested name, to the client. In fact, DNS messages include
Ressource Records (RRs) which reflect the types of queries
and answers. For example, A is the type representing an IPv4
address.
As highlighted in Figure 1, a passive DNS probe is deployed
to gather all traffic between the recursive server and the others
to keep confidential the original IP address of the DNS client.
Then, metrics are computed on the collected names based on
a semantic tool, DISCO [11], before being used to figure out
suspect domain names that should be tracked more attentively
for forensics.
III. SEMANTIC METRICS
Unlike standard texts, domain names are composed of few
words and so deriving a global semantic is hard. To make
it easier, grouping multiple names to increase the number of
words before determining the overall semantic is possible. It
is also compatible with forensics since infected or attacked
machines will probably communicate with multiple malicious
hosts or also because a malicious domain can support several
malicious subdomains or an IP subnet can belong to an AS
known to host malware [12].
We assume that this grouping is already performed using
a state-of-the-art technique like [13]. Hence, the goal is to
analyse if domain names from two different set types, legiti-
mate or malicious, are composed of words that share semantic
similarities or disclose semantic differences. Thus, there are
several steps: (1) an extraction of the words that compose a
domain, (2) find a metric characterizing semantic relatedness
between two words and, (3) develop metrics to give a score
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Fig. 2: Example of words extraction for
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of similarity between two sets composed of several domain
names.
A. Word extraction
The first requirement is to split the domain names in order
to extract all words that composed them as highlighted in
Figure 2. These words are supposed to belong to a particular
semantic field in order to give a similarity score with other
words. Domain names are first split by level according to the
separating dots, “.”, and the TLD is excluded based on the
list from iana.org3, as using the related country semantic is
too naive. Since hyphens (“-”) are allowed in DNS names, a
second split is done accordingly. Furthermore, the digits are
removed and considered also as separating characters. This
leads to have remaining parts composed of letters only ([a-z]
as DNS does not differentiate the character case), which can
still be composed of several words like computeraskmore or
cloudantimalware.
The segmentation of alphabetical parts leverages a technique
from [14] that consists in successively dividing a label in two
parts until finding the combination that gives the maximum
probability. Hence, assuming a label l, for each position i ∈
[1; len(l)], l is divided in two parts and the probability P (l, i)
is:
P (l, i) = Pword(pre(l, i))× Pword(post(l, i)) (1)
where pre(l, i) returns the substring of l composed of the first
i characters and post(l, i) is the remaining part. Pword(w)
returns the probability of having the word w, equivalent to
its frequency in a database of text samples. This process is
applied to all newly split parts pre(l, i) and post(l, i) as long
as ∃i ∈ [1; len(l)− 1], P (l, i) ≥ Pword(l).
Finally, we propose to count the occurrences of words
because a word appearing more frequently than others should
have a bigger impact in the global semantic of a set of words.
As shown in Figure 2, couples (word, occurrence) are stored
in a vector W for further analysis
3http://data.iana.org/TLD/tlds-alpha-by-domain.txt accessed on 10/06/12
position −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3
sample1 a client uses services of the platform
sample2 the platform provides services to the client
||services,−2, platform||=1 ||services,−3, the||=1
||services,−2, client||=1 ||services,−3, a||=1
||services,−1, uses||=1 ||services, 1, of ||=1
||services,−1, provides||=1 ||services, 1, to||=1
||services, 3, platform||=1 ||services,2,the||=2
||services, 3, client||=1
TABLE I: Example of co-occurrence counting (2 windows
centered on services)
B. Semantic score
Once all words that are likely to be meaningful are ex-
tracted from domain names, evaluating the semantic similarity
between sets of domains and so sets of words is required. For
this purpose, DISCO [11] is leveraged, a tool based on efficient
and accurate techniques to automatically give a score of the
relatedness between two words. To calculate this score, called
similarity, DISCO defines a sliding window of four words.
This window is applied to the content of a dictionary such
as Wikipedia4 and the metric ‖w, r, w′‖ is calculated as the
number of times that the word w′ occurs r words after the
word w in the window, therefore r ∈ {−3; 3} \ {0}. Table
I highlights an example of the calculation of ‖w, r, w′‖ for
two sample pieces of text. Afterwards the mutual information
between w and w′, I(w, r, w′) is defined as:
I(w, r, w′) = log
(‖w, r, w′‖ − 0.95)× ‖∗, r, ∗‖
‖w, r, ∗‖ × ‖∗, r, w′‖ (2)
Finally, the similarity sim(w1, w2) between two words w1
and w2 is given by the formula:
sim(w1, w2) =∑
(r,w)∈T (w1)∩T (w2) I(w1, r, w) + I(w2, r, w)∑
(r,w)∈T (w1) I(w1, r, w) +
∑
(r,w)∈T (w2) I(w2, r, w)
(3)
where T (w) is all the pairs (r, w′) | I(w, r, w′) > 0.
Using this measure and given a word w1, DISCO can
either give a similarity score with another word w2 or return
Disco(w1, n), the n most related words, wi, ordered by their
decreasing respective similarity score sim(w1, wi).
C. Similarity metrics
Given a set of p domain names D = {d1, ...., dp}, words
are extracted from each domain name following the technique
given in section III-A. They form a set of n words with
their corresponding number of occurrences in all the set of
domains WD = {(w1, ow1), ...., (wn, own)}. distwordwi,WD
is the frequency of a word wi in WD:
distwordwi,WD =
owi∑
j∈{1,n} owj
(4)
Following this formula, three metrics are defined to quantify
the semantic similarities between two sets of domain names,
A and B.
4http://www.wikipedia.org, accessed on 10/06/12
Sim1(A,B) considers all the words wA ∈ WA and wB ∈
WB and compares them pairwise using DISCO:
Sim1(A,B) =
∑
wA∈WA
∑
wB∈WB
sim(wA, wB) (5)
The second metric is close to the first one except that it takes
into account the number of occurrences of the words into each
dataset A and B. Logically, this is done such that the similarity
obtained from words appearing more frequently would have
a bigger impact on the metric than the one computed from
words that appear once or few times.
Therefore, when calculating Sim2(A,B), sim(wA, wB) is
multiplied by the frequency of wA and wB in their respective
dataset to give a weight to each similarity:
Sim2(A,B) =
∑
wA∈WA
∑
wB∈WB
sim(wA, wB)
×distwordwA,WA × distwordwB ,WB
(6)
Since preliminary experiments show that calculating
sim(wA, wB) is time consuming (around 0.5 sec with a
standard desktop PC: Intel Core 2 Quad 2.83Ghz, 4GB RAM),
pairwise comparisons in equations (5) and (6) are not effi-
cient. Retrieving the top hundred most related words of w
using Disco(w, n) requires approximatively the same amount
of time than sim(wA, wB). Thus, we propose to keep the
semantic analysis by extracting the most related words of each
word of the set WA before searching them into the set WB :
Sim′3(A,B) =
∑
w∈WA
∑
w′∈Disco(w,n)
sim(w,w′)
×distwordw′,WB
(7)
As highlighted, the score is still weighted by the frequency
of word w′. Although there is no pairwise comparison any-
more, Sim′3(A,B) is not symmetric. Thus, we define:
Sim3(A,B) = Sim
′
1(A,B) + Sim
′
1(B,A) (8)
Hence, there are three metrics Sim1, Sim2 and Sim3
defined in equations (5), (6) and (8) respectively, returning
a score between two sets of domains in terms of semantic
relatedness.
The calculation complexity of these metrics relies on the
number of words w that are extracted from a set D composed
of n domains. A domain name can be composed of several
words, but considering that several words appear in different
domains of the same set we can reasonably approximate n '
w. Hence, assuming that we compare two domain sets of n
elements each, the complexity of Sim1 and Sim2 is O(n2).
As Sim3 does not make pairwise comparisons of all words,
its complexity is O(n).
IV. EVALUATION
A. Datasets
To test our method, two sets of domains are formed:
a legitimate one, containing non-malicious domain names
and a malicious one, containing domain names from which
maliciousness has been proved.
Malicious Dataset: Three freely downloadable blacklists
are used to construct the dataset containing malicious domain
names. These have been selected because each of them pro-
poses an historic of blacklisted domains including different
types of related malicious activities like spamming, phishing,
worm spreading, fake anti-virus, etc. Since they contain several
entries, a large dataset of malicious domain names is obtained.
Thus, it clearly strengthens the validation of our method. The
details are as follows:
• PhishTank5: PhishTank is a community website where
contributors can add potential phishing URLs which will
be then tested to update a global blacklist. 5,521 phishing
URLs have been gathered for our experiments.
• DNS-BH6: DNS-Black-Hole maintains an up-to-date list
of domains known to support malware and spyware
diffusion. A list of 17,035 malicious domains is available.
• MDL7: like Phishtank, Malware Domain List is based
on a community approach and construct a blacklist from
proposed inputs from contributors. This list contains
82,480 URL entries.
After removing duplicate entries, the final dataset contains
66,633 distinct domain names.
Legitimate Dataset: The objective is to faithfully represent
normal domain names in a realistic manner relying on two
sources:
• Alexa8: Alexa provides a ranking of websites based on
browsing statistics. 50,000 domains in the top 200,000
have been extracted for our experiments.
• Passive DNS from a Luxembourg ISP (Internet Service
Provider): this dataset was obtained using a passive DNS
infrastructure similar to the one described in section II in
collaboration with a Luxembourg ISP. It is composed of
16,633 DNS names after having deleted duplicate entries
from Alexa and known malicious domains (from the
previously described blacklists)
Finally, 66,633 entries are contained in the legitimate
datasets. Hence, the two datasets, legitimate and malicious
have an equivalent size.
B. Results
To assess the relevancy of semantic approach in identifica-
tion of malicious domain names, this section shows that words
composing the malicious domain names belong to different
semantic fields than those from legitimate domain names
even if malicious domains use pattern or brands to mimic
composition of famous URLs.
To have an extensive evaluation, initial malicious and le-
gitimate datasets defined in previous section are split in five
subsets of equivalent size (13,326 domains). These ten subsets
called mal-i, i ∈ {1; 5} for malicious domains, and leg-i,
i ∈ {1; 5} for legitimate domains, are then compared by
5http://www.phishtank.com, accessed on 15/06/12
6http://www.malwaredomains.com, accessed on 15/06/12
7http://www.malwaredomainlist.com, accessed on 15/06/12
8http://www.alexa.com, accessed on 15/06/12
leg-5 leg-4 leg-3 leg-2 leg-1 mal-5 mal-4 mal-3 mal-2
mal-1 19.3 19.3 20.1 18.7 20.1 29.7 30.0 30.3 31.0
mal-2 19.4 19.3 20.2 18.8 20.2 29.4 29.6 30.0
mal-3 19.2 19.2 19.9 18.5 19.9 28.6 28.9
mal-4 18.5 18.4 19.2 17.9 19.1 28.4
mal-5 18.3 18.3 19.0 17.8 19.0
leg-1 25.7 25.6 26.1 25.1
leg-2 24.5 24.4 25.0
leg-3 25.5 25.5
leg-4 24.8
15 19 23 27 31 35
TABLE II: Values of Sim1 between malicious and legitimate
subsets
leg-5 leg-4 leg-3 leg-2 leg-1 mal-5 mal-4 mal-3 mal-2
mal-1 1.034 1.069 1.033 0.989 1.010 1.366 1.332 1.385 1.332
mal-2 1.033 1.053 1.035 0.994 1.013 1.369 1.298 1.365
mal-3 1.085 1.137 1.089 1.046 1.058 1.388 1.347
mal-4 1.013 1.041 1.002 0.964 0.964 1.370
mal-5 1.010 1.051 1.002 0.972 0.972
leg-1 1.475 1.481 1.489 1.455
leg-2 1.455 1.452 1.507
leg-3 1.508 1.525
leg-4 1.472
0.9 1.04 1.18 1.32 1.46 1.6
TABLE III: Values of Sim2 × 103 between malicious and
legitimate subsets
computing similarity scores. In fact, the following comparisons
are done:
• Sets composed of malicious domains vs. sets composed
of malicious domains
• Sets composed of malicious domains vs. sets composed
of legitimate domains
• Sets composed of legitimate domains vs. sets composed
of legitimate domains
In order to keep meaningful words for this study, only words
composed of at least 4 characters are considered. It avoids
considering generic words such as the, of, www, etc.
Table II shows the score of Sim1 computed between all the
malicious and legitimate subsets. For guaranteeing high per-
formance, only the 100 most occurring words are considered
in each subset. A gray shaded key is used for improving the
readability and three main areas are easily separable: mal/leg,
leg/leg, mal/mal. Therefore the first metric, Sim1 is helpful
for distinguishing malicious and legitimate DNS names. The
lowest values are logically obtained when the types of subsets
are different (mal/leg) where the score are mainly under 20
and are clearly different when two sets of the same types are
compared. Comparing two legitimate sets, a value around 25
is reached while malicious datasets exhibit a higher semantic
similarity with a maximum of 31. Thus, the semantic field
of words used in malicious words has a smaller scope than
normal ones confirming that attackers targets specific services
leg-5 leg-4 leg-3 leg-2 leg-1 mal-5 mal-4 mal-3 mal-2
mal-1 0.776 0.795 0.793 0.789 0.785 0.955 0.962 0.965 0.975
mal-2 0.782 0.800 0.798 0.797 0.797 0.965 0.968 0.973
mal-3 0.772 0.796 0.793 0.788 0.784 0.951 0.962
mal-4 0.783 0.804 0.804 0.800 0.796 0.953
mal-5 0.769 0.785 0.784 0.782 0.772
leg-1 0.946 0.948 0.952 0.938
leg-2 0.915 0.924 0.922
leg-3 0.936 0.934
leg-4 0.935
0.7 0.76 0.82 0.88 0.94 1.00
TABLE IV: Values of Sim3 between malicious and legitimate
subsets
when luring users. Finally the score between malicious subsets
is 50% higher than for mal/leg.
Regarding Sim2 in table III (the score is multiply by
1,000 for readability purposes), legitimate domains look more
specific than malicious ones as clearly shown by a lighter
area for leg/leg in table. The difference with Sim1 is that
frequencies of occurrences are taken in account. Therefore,
even if semantic scope of words is larger for normal names
(lower Sim1), some of them are often used explaining a higher
value for Sim2. Nevertheless, table III discloses the same
properties when two different types of datasets (mal/leg)
are compared. Hence, Sim2 is also a good alternative to
distinguish malicious and legitimate domains.
Table IV represents the value of Sim3 between the subsets.
After preliminary tests, n was set to 100 in equation (7). We
can see similar scores for mal/mal and leg/leg comparisons
(Sim3 ∼ 0.95) that are higher than mal/leg (Sim3 ∼ 0.75).
Like previously, this metric is able to differentiate malicious
names from legitimate ones.
These experiments highlight that the three metrics Sim1,
Sim2 and Sim3 lead to efficiently discriminate malicious and
legitimate datasets. An application of this result is to consider
one of this metric and, given a set of malicious domain names,
identify if an unknown set is either malicious or not. Even if
the differences in values are proportionally lower than Sim1
and Sim2, Sim3 is more computational efficient as mentioned
in previous section. That is why, Sim3 is computed between
the subset mal-1, the model, and two other subsets, from mal-
2 (mal) and leg-5 (leg). Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the
average value according to the number of domain names in
each subset (mal and leg) compared to mal-1. Ideally, the
tested subset should contain a unique name, meaning that we
are able to identify if a unique DNS name is malicious or not.
However, as explained in section III, a single domain name is
composed of few words for which it is hard to derive a relevant
semantic metric and thus domains have to be grouped prior
using some state of the art technique (IP subnet, autonomous
systems, registration address, etc).
Hence, for small size of subsets (from 1 to 60 domains),
the curves are really close even if Sim3(mal-1,mal) ' 2 ×
0
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Fig. 3: Similarity score Sim3 regarding the number of domains
in the set
Sim3(mal-1, leg). But for more than 60 domains, a real gap is
observed. Hence, malicious domains could be easily identified
using a simple threshold technique. This result shows that a
set of names can be identified as legitimate or malicious.
V. RELATED WORK
In [15], the author figures out valuable data provided by
DNS in forensics context but rely on a manual analysis. Active
monitoring [16], [17], [18] is based on gathering information
about domains to detect DNS anomalies but is a bit out of
the scope in the context of forensics. Therefore passive DNS
proposed in [6] has gained a lot of interests. The authors in
[19], [20] leverage such a technique for applying classification
algorithms to detect malicious domains. Different features
can be used, or evaluated through statistical metrics, like the
number of IP addresses, the TTL (time-to-live) or the longest
meaningful word of a DNS entry, etc. In [21], the principle is
applied at a higher level in DNS hierarchy. Character and gram
frequencies may also reveal misbehaviors like DNS tunneling
[22] or fast-flux [23]. In [24], similar statistics are consid-
ered to build a model for exploring a domain by generating
subdomains automatically. TreeTop [13] employs aggregation
techniques on both domain names and IP addresses for an
efficient visualization of the DNS traffic.
Close to the challenges in DNS analysis, phishing URL
detection has been addressed in many works as for example
[25], [26]. Such methods focus more on lexical features but
does not take in account the semantic of words. Thus, we
introduce the use of semantic in DNS [27] for generating
automatically domain names, using a markov chain model,
to probe in the context of security assessment. In [28],
this approach is extended for identifying phishing domains
proactively for further checking, i.e. for creating proactively a
blacklist similarly to [29], [30]. This paper clearly differs from
our previous works [24], [28] which propose active techniques
generating a lot of DNS traffic. For instance, generating
potential phishing domains needs an additional step to check
the validity of the result in real-time which is incompatible
with an offline post-mortem analysis. In addition, markov
chain model is discarded to improve the scalability. Thus, this
work is based on the same key finding, i.e. DNS names have
a relevant semantic, but proposes new metrics adapted to the
forensics context.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented in this paper a new approach for mining
DNS data. DNS is the glue that holds the Internet together
and thus is a natural candidate for early digital forensics. The
target application domain of our work is the reconstruction of
network and user or host level activity. Our approach combines
state of the art semantic and natural processing paradigms in
order to build and use models for spotting malicious domain
names. The obtained names can be used as enablers and
guiding lines for an initial network forensic analysis. We have
shown, on real world data captured from a national passive
DNS system, that our approach is practical in real scenarios.
The developed tool is published under a GPL license and
is available on request. We plan to extend the current tool
with additional support for cross linking with additional IP
Flow records and thus have an integrated tool for the forensics
reconstruction of network activities.
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